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Abstract: The expected penalty for drunk driving can and does vary by blood alcohol content.
This paper outlines the “penalty structure” that does this optimally, using two
different metrics, shows how the optimality conditions can be implemented with
available data to analyze policy ex ante or ex post, and then uses these findings to
investigate four fundamental features of current U.S. drunk driving policy.  The paper
provides theoretical and empirical support for large penalties at very high alcohol
concentrations, but not for reductions in per se blood alcohol thresholds, the most
significant recent change in drunk driving policy.
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Drunk driving legislation has encountered diminishing returns.  Alcohol-related traffic deaths
fell after a flurry of federal and state action in the 1980s, which included increasing the minimum legal
drinking age to twenty-one.  More recently the focus has shifted to lowering per se illegal blood
alcohol thresholds, to 0.08 percent for adults and, with “zero tolerance” laws, to nearly zero for
among drivers under twenty-one, each now adopted nationwide.  Still, of the more than 40,000
annual U.S. traffic fatalities, one-third involve drivers who are legally drunk, a fraction that has
remained constant for a decade.
Despite intensive analysis of drunk driving policy by economists, however, it is unclear how
to proceed.  Partly this is due to a lack of consensus.  These studies typically estimate policies’ effects
on traffic fatalities using panel data analyses that exploit variation in the dates these policies are
adopted by different states.  Differences in technique, sample, and controls have often yielded variable
or conflicting results, as with the laws mentioned above (Dee, 2001; Eisenberg, 2003; Freeman, 2007;
Grant, 2006; Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen, 1999; Ruhm, 1996).  These studies are also inherently
retrospective, and so cannot be used to analyze proposed changes in the law.
To try to resolve this impasse, we introduce in this paper a complementary, theoretically-
grounded method for evaluating existing policy or assessing new policy proposals.  We treat drunk
driving laws not as a single blood alcohol concentration (BAC) threshold at which one may receive
all penalties authorized by statute, but as a menu, or schedule, of penalties associated with different
BACs.  This perspective mirrors recent changes in the law, as many states have recently moved away
from single thresholds by adopting aggravated drunk driving laws that strengthen penalties at very
high BACs. (These have received but brief attention in the literature, by Jacobs, 1989, and Kenkel,
1993a, who reach opposite conclusions.)  We then characterize the schedule of penalties, or “penalty2
structure,” that is socially optimal.  This optimality condition can be evaluated with existing
epidemiological and economic data to assess current law, recent changes in policy, or new policy
proposals.  Because severely impaired drivers are one hundred times more dangerous than moderate
drinkers, an improved schedule of penalties might significantly improve traffic safety.
Our empirical analysis of existing policy reveals significant violations of the conditions for
economic efficiency and a plausible alternate social objective, “expediency,” which generate similar
policy recommendations.  While some of these accord with recent changes in U.S. drunk driving law,
others do not.  The first section of the paper introduces the key building blocks of the analysis and
derives the optimality conditions; the second introduces the data used to evaluate them; the third
section presents results and the last conclusions.
I.  Theory.
Setup.  Two primitives govern policy design: drivers’ preferences for alcohol and the physiological
relationship between alcohol impairment and driving safety (the expected external costs imposed on
third parties by any given impaired driver).  From these a schedule of drunk driving penalties can be
designed so as to maximize some objective.  The alcohol consumption then chosen by drivers, mindful
of these penalties, ultimately determines the actual costs of drunk driving experienced by third parties.
Let c represent alcohol consumption, in BAC units, cn* the privately optimal value chosen by
consumer n given existing penalties, and c 5 the maximum consumption level for which there is no per
se drunk driving violation.  There are six variables of interest, each a function of c:3
Variable Name Variable Type Symbol Variable Description
Consumer
Preferences
primitive Vn (c)  the amount consumer n is willing to pay for
permission to purchase c units of alcohol at
the market price, drink them, and then drive
Driving
Impairment
primitive X(c) the expected, monetized external damages to
life, health, and property generated by a
driver who has consumed c units of alcohol
Drunk Driving 
Penalty Structure
policy S(c) the expected, monetized value of the legal
penalties incurred from driving after
consuming c units of alcohol
Resource Costs policy R(c) the expected costs, for arrest, conviction,
and punishment, expended on a driver who





Q(c) the number (technically, density) of drivers





H(c) the monetized external costs of life, health,
and property loss generated by all drivers
who have consumed c units of alcohol
All expectations are unconditional–that is, per driver or per trip, not per arrest or accident.  In the
theory each variable is assumed continuous and measured in dollars where appropriate; in practice
they are measured, in a variety of units, in standard BAC increments of 0.01 percent.
Analysis can proceed on two margins.  The extensive margin concerns the resources devoted
to drunk driving deterrence and, loosely put, the overall magnitude of penalties for drunk driving.
This margin has been adequately studied by Kenkel (1993a, 1993b, 1996), who concludes that
existing penalties were inefficiently low and that the social costs of deterrence through alcohol-control
policies slightly exceed those of alcohol taxation.
The focus of our paper, instead, is the intensive margin–the “shape” of the penalty structure,
or how penalties grow with BAC.  For this one can derive equations, analogous to cost-minimization
conditions in production theory, that show how best to structure penalties across BAC levels for any2 The resource costs per arrest and conviction in Kenkel (1993b) and the average probability
of arrest in Kenkel (1993a) yields a resource cost of roughly $2 per occasion of drunk driving.  The
latter source also estimates total external costs to be about $50 per occasion of drunk driving.  And
data below show that X rises faster than R does.  Thus, XN is at least twenty-five times RN.
Equation (1) implicitly assumes punishment involves transfers (fines) rather than deadweight
losses (license suspensions or jail time).  These cannot be justified under any efficiency criterion.  One
can easily show, however, that the optimality condition derived below takes the same form if
deadweight losses form a constant proportion (in c) of all penalties, which is reasonably accurate.
3 This natural and typical assumption may require more rationality than is present.  Studies
have shown many people do not “know the applicable laws in their states” (Kenkel and Koch, 2001)
and that the certainty of punishment deters youth more strongly than its severity (Grosvenor,
Toomey, and Wagenaar, 1999).  In the most complete model, based on an extensive literature review
(Donovan, Marlatt, and Salzburg, 1983), “drinking behavior, personality traits, [and] emotional
stress” combine to produce high risk driving: “When an individual...deficient in those social skills
involved in the appropriate expression of anger and the management of stress, frustration or
depression....is confronted by an acute emotional stress...the availability of alcohol or an automobile
may provide an alternative means...of dealing with their underlying feelings in the absence of more
adaptive emotional expression...  Such individuals appear to [expect] that both alcohol and driving
are effective in decreasing tension [and] increasing feelings of personal power, mastery and control.
The probability of drinking and driving together is thus increased.”
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given level of resources/penalty magnitudes.  Because these equations do not require specific units
of measurement for any variable, they can be evaluated effectively with our data.  Upon doing so,
deviations from optimality and the policy changes implied are immediately apparent.
Efficiency.  We first assume, as is natural, the policy objective is economic efficiency, that is:
because harmful internal effects of drunk driving are already captured in V.  The optimality condition
VnN = XN + RN is to be met at all cn*.  We can neglect RN, which is dominated by XN.
2  Then, assuming
expected utility maximization by consumers,
3 the policymaker should set SN = XN for all c.  This is just
the standard Pigovian tax that forces agents to internalize external costs.  One could assess policy5
(2)
efficiency by evaluating this condition at all values of c if S and X are measured in dollars.  We cannot
do this reliably, as previously discussed, and need not, given our focus in this paper.
For our purpose a weaker condition, necessary but not sufficient for efficiency, allows S and
X to be measured in arbitrary units.  This condition, in the spirit of Mirrlees (1976), is analogous to
the equi-marginal principle in production theory, and requires only that any decrease in drunk driving
damages be done at least cost to consumers (the smallest aggregate reduction in V):
with M an arbitrary scalar.  The optimality condition VnN = 8XN, with 8(M) the scalar Lagrange
multiplier on the constraint, is to be met at all cn*; this is achieved by setting SN = 8XN for all c.  Then
XN/SN should be constant over this domain but the value of the constant need not be specified.  For
any cost-effective penalty structure S*, any multiple kS* is also cost-effective: the “level of penalties”
can be separated from the shape of the penalty structure.
We can interpret XN/SN as a ratio of marginal benefits (the reduction in drunk driving damages
imposed on third parties) to marginal “costs” (the value of the marginal reduction in alcohol
consumption by drivers).  When this ratio is not constant, an equal reduction in external damages can
be obtained at less aggregate inconvenience to drinkers by raising the marginal penalty at BAC levels
where this ratio is large and lowering it where this ratio is small; or a larger reduction in external
health damages obtained at the same aggregate inconvenience, in the same way.  This condition
requires drunk driving damages to be reduced in the most cost-effective manner, so we term this
objective “cost-effectiveness,” with the health economics connotation deliberate.
Because this ratio is unitless, we take logarithms so that (modest) deviations from optimality6
(3)
are expressed in (roughly) percentage terms.  This yields the cost-effectiveness optimality condition:
with 6 a constant whose value is meaningful only when S and X are measured in identical units: then
6 = 0 implies efficiency, 6 > 0 an inefficiently low penalty, and 6 < 0 an inefficiently high penalty.
Even when not so measured, the left-hand side of this equation should be constant for, at least, all
c > c 5.  If not, strengthening marginal penalties is most desirable in the BAC range where the left-hand
side of this equation takes the most positive value.
Expediency.  Economic efficiency may not be policymakers’ objective, however, because society may
not give drunk drivers “standing” in the cost-benefit analysis that underlies efficient policy design.
This necessitates balancing marginal external costs with the utility losses derived from reduced
alcohol consumption.  But society, in branding the drunk driver a criminal, may refuse to incorporate
these losses into the determination of policy.  Then drunk driving is not longer a typical externality
problem.  To quote Trumbull (1990, p. 212; see also numerous references therein): “Society has a
purpose when it labels certain acts criminal; the label communicates that these acts will not be
tolerated or counted in the social weal.”  Trumbull frames this in terms of rights; the setting of drunk
driving thresholds may be construed as identifying a threshold at which the individual no longer has
the right to use public roads.  Kenkel (1998) contains a thorough discussion of the issues involved
in using economic efficiency to design drunk driving policy. 
The “rights” perspective can be illustrated by the most recent extended spirited debate on
drunk driving policy in Congress, which concerned a 1998 bill impelling the states to adopt a 0.087
per se illegal BAC limit for adult drivers.  (Congressional Record 144, no. 19-20, 3-4 March
1998:S1236-S1305.  Technically an amendment to a larger transportation bill, it passed the Senate
62-32, with bipartisan support and bipartisan opposition, but was dropped in conference.  A similar
bill became law with little discussion in the next Congress.) Proponents asserted that significant
driving impairment occurs at 0.08, that this impairment makes drivers more dangerous, and that the
lower limit would reduce traffic fatalities.  None of these points were disputed by the opposition.
Proponents also recognized three relevant costs: the external costs of drunk driving just
mentioned, the “cost” to the restaurant and beverage industry in lost sales, and the potential cost of
limiting social drinking, such as “two beers and a pizza.”  The first was presumably recognized by all
parties, while the other two were asserted to be nil, with evidence presented that restaurant and
alcohol sales were not affected by 0.08 laws in individual states.  These assertions were also
undisputed.  Tellingly, neither side mentioned the key “cost” on which efficiency hinges, consumer
surplus lost by reduced alcohol consumption among heavy drinkers intending to drive.
Instead of costs, the debate turned on rights.  Three rights were acknowledged: social
drinkers’ right to consume modest amounts of alcohol and drive (or large amounts and not drive),
citizens’ right to drive on safe roads, and each state’s right to choose its own highway safety
legislation.  None of these rights were ever disputed either; the question was whether the second or
third would prevail.  Three quotes frame the two sides’ positions adequately:
Dorgan (D-ND): You have a right to get drunk...in this country, but you do not have
a right to get drunk and drive.  That ought to be a message from the .08 amendment.
DeWine (R-OH): It is a question of rights...the right to have a fair chance on the
highway, not to have someone come at you who has been drinking and driving.8
(4)
(5)
Nickles (R-OK, also see Thomas, R-WY): If I were a state legislator, I would support
the lower level [.08]...But I think, again, we are trampling on State’s rights.
The record, at least on this legislation, indicates lawmakers’ lodestone is not economic efficiency, but
the desire to lower drunk driving fatalities as much as possible within this framework of rights, and
an implicit citizens’ right (provided by the eighth amendment) that punishment not be excessive.
This conclusion leads directly to an alternative mathematical program in which fatalities are
minimized subject to penalty bounds, as follows:
with SMAX the penalty maximum.  Taking the dual of the cost-effectiveness program, equation (2),
the objective remains the same, only the constraint has changed.  Therefore the policy implications
of the two frameworks, while different, need not be divergent.
This framework has not trivialized the problem.  Optimality implies the maximum penalty
SMAX will be imposed at the largest conceivable BAC level, cmax, which for practical purposes is about
0.40, but not necessarily below that level.  Rather, the policymaker will “parcel out” marginal
penalties SN / M across the entire domain to maximize efficacy (barring a corner solution).  We can
derive and evaluate the optimality condition that describes the outcomes associated with this policy.
This condition is most easily expressed using M:
where 8 $(SMAX) is a (different) scalar Lagrange multiplier, and cn* is chosen using VnN = SN / M, as
above.  To interpret this condition, consider Figure 1, which presents the optimal marginal penalty9
(6)
(7)
structure M(c) and a small change in that policy (an extremal) at c $, magnified in size.  Drivers Y and
Z respond to this change by reducing their consumption, as shown in the figure.  The marginal effect
of this small increase in penalties equals the change in consumption it inspires, Mc*/MM, converted into
external costs using XN, for all individuals affected by the policy, which is proportional to Q(c $), thus
generating the following close approximation to equation (5):
where the average is taken across all drivers affected by the policy at that value of c.  Optimality
implies a type of equi-marginal condition: the marginal effect of a small change to the penalty
structure, the product of the number of drivers affected, the average change in consumption of those
affected, and the rate at which this change reduces external costs, should be equal for all c > c 5.
Otherwise drunk driving damages could be decreased by rearranging the penalty structure, without
increasing the maximum penalty, or one is at a corner solution, in which case marginal penalties
should be focused on consumption levels where the marginal effect is greatest.
While Q is not measured, it is proportional to H/X, each of which are measured; substituting
and taking logarithms yields a relation that is less easily interpreted but more easily quantified:
with  $ 6 again an arbitrary constant.  We call this condition “expediency,” because of its political
connotations.  An expedient policy reduces the external costs of drunk driving as much as possible
given the socio-political constraints limiting the severity of penalties that can be imposed.
With expediency, unlike cost-effectiveness, the magnitude of penalties and the shape of the10
(8)
penalty structure are intertwined.  The former, the extensive margin, is indexed by SMAX.  When this
is small, penalties are weak, and will focus on heavy drinkers, who cause great damage when driving.
In essence, with scarce amounts of “marginal penalty” to distribute, they will be put where they do
the most good.  Only when penalties are stronger, and drunk driving is diminished, can attention be
paid to more modest drinkers.  In the extreme, penalties are draconian, and are fully applied at low
BACs, which few drinkers will exceed.  This evolution is broadly consistent with the reduction in
BAC thresholds observed in the U.S. as drunk driving sanctions have become more forceful.  Because
penalty magnitudes influence the shape of the expedient penalty structure, one cannot delineate a
unitless optimality condition directly in terms of penalties, S, as we did for cost-effectiveness.  But
we can using outcomes, H, which is how equation (7) is expressed.
The expediency and cost-effectiveness conditions are clearly distinct, but are not necessarily
at odds.  Increasing marginal penalties at c $ will reduce fatalities at that alcohol concentration, H(c $),
so both conditions will take smaller values.  While existing policy might be more closely aligned with
expediency than cost-effectiveness, or vice versa, similar policy adjustments could be called for under
both.  This would be fortuitous, for economic analysis can more usefully inform policy if its
prescriptions are not sensitive to the assumed policy objective.
We can set out the circumstances under which the two conditions imply equivalent penalty
structures by solving for X' in each, equating them, and rearranging:
When Mc 2*/MM is constant across BAC levels, which appears to be roughly the case (see below),
expediency and cost-effectiveness equate if Q is inversely proportional to M.11
II.  Data.
To evaluate our optimality conditions, the terms XN, Mc G*/MM, H, and M must be measured for
all feasible BACs for which driving is outlawed, which as a practical matter, given our data, is
[0.08,0.24].  Each optimality condition only requires constancy across values of c, so the units of
measurement do not matter.  Three of these terms can be evaluated with reasonable precision and the
other bounded conservatively, that is, so as not to promote our ultimate policy recommendations.
The marginal external cost primitive, XN, is taken from Blomberg et al.’s (2005) monolithic,
exhaustive, NHTSA-funded case-control study of 15,000 drivers in Florida and California, one-third
crash-involved, the remainder controls.  Relative crash probabilities were determined for each 0.01
unit of BAC using standard case-control methods.  Using accident and driver-survey data, these were
adjusted for driver demographics and accident characteristics using logistic regression, and then
further adjusted for data collection problems stemming from missing covariates, refused breath tests,
and hit-and-runs, using supplemental data collected by the investigators.  The 95% confidence interval
on the crash risks, roughly ±15%, is well below the range of variation in the risks themselves.
Figure 2 presents X, the crash risk relative to a non-drinker (whose value is one), and its
difference, X(c) - X(c-.01) . XN.  Relative risks increase at an increasing rate, rising dramatically
above 0.10 and even more dramatically around 0.20, a range that exceeds the current adult threshold
of 0.08 by a wide margin.  Compared to legal BACs, relative risks in this neighborhood are one
hundred times higher and their rate of increase, XN, ten times higher.
These data do not account for crash severity, and the relative risk of fatal crashes increases
even more rapidly with BAC (Zador et al., 2000).  This presents no bias if crashes and fatalities are12
proportional, as our optimality conditions are unitless.  Comparable data on fatal crash risks for the
full BAC domain is unavailable, but we can investigate further by comparing crash and fatality
numbers by BAC for one state that identifies both, California (Tashima and Daoud, 2007).  These are
listed in Figure 3 for 2004 in log points.  Over the 0.08-0.24 BAC range, the two measures differ by
roughly a constant number of log points–they are indeed roughly proportional.
The data also do not distinguish external costs from costs internalized by drunk drivers.  It
is not even clear how this should be done, whether, for example, X should count harm to drivers that
underestimate the risks of drunk driving, or exclude harm to passengers who may rationally recognize
the risks of riding with a drunk driver (Kenkel, 1998).  Fortunately, Figure 3 shows that driver
fatalities and passenger fatalities are also roughly proportional over the 0.08-0.24 BAC range, so
there will be no bias however they are weighted.
The second term, Mc G*/MM, measures the responsiveness of consumption to penalties.  Despite
much work on the effects of BAC limits on aggregate fatalities, little is known about their effects on
alcohol consumption among different types of drinkers.  An evaluation of zero tolerance laws by
Wagenaar, O’Malley, and LaFond (2001) indicates similar reductions in mild drinking and heavy
drinking, and similar reductions in driving after drinking for both groups.  An investigation of the
same laws by Carpenter (2004) found greater reductions in heavy drinking than overall drinking and
no change in drunk driving conditional on drinking.  These studies suggest Mc G*/MM is, at least, no
smaller for heavy drinkers.
More plentiful, but less direct, evidence comes from studies of the price elasticity of alcohol
among light and heavy drinkers.  (Evidence on the price elasticity of drunk driving, rather than
drinking, among different types of drinkers is not available.)  The relevant estimates indicate price4 Driver BAC is measured directly in about half of the observations and is imputed using
NHTSA’s imputation technique for the others, mostly nondrinkers (Subramanian and Utter, 1998).
Only about 5% of the observations involve drinking drivers with unmeasured BAC.  
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responsiveness among all but possibly the very heaviest drinkers.  Chaloupka, Grossman, and Saffer
(2002) review several studies of drinking among young adults that collectively show absolute declines
in consumption, in response to price increases, that are at least as large among heavy drinkers as
among light or moderate drinkers.  Manning et al. (1995) and Kenkel (1996) find the overall price
elasticity of heavy drinkers to be about half that of moderate drinkers (at least for men; it is higher
for women), which also implies similar absolute changes in consumption, as heavy drinkers consume
much more alcohol on average.  Finally, Farrell et al. (2003) find a substantial price elasticity of heavy
drinking that seems to exceed that for drinking generally.  Collectively, these studies also indicate
Mc G*/MM is not smaller at high BACs.  For simplicity we assume–conservatively given our
conclusions–it is constant for all c.
Realized fatalities, H, are measured using the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) of
the National Highway Safety Transportation Administration (NHTSA), which records the BAC of
all drivers involved in all fatal crashes on U.S. public roads.
4  It is unclear how to ascribe
responsibility in multivehicle crashes, so we tried two methods: 1) only tabulating fatalities in single-
vehicle crashes, and 2) assigning all fatalities to the largest BAC among all drivers involved in the
crash.  Over the 0.08-0.24 BAC range we focus on, the two gave almost identical results, so the
former is used here.  Results were tabulated for all BAC levels for all states over the period 1988-
2000.  The long period was necessary to minimize “sampling error”; over the period many states had
per se limits of 0.10, roughly consistent with the data used to calculate S.  We did not exclude states
with lower BAC limits, preferring to retain a balanced panel.  This inclusiveness represented a5 Because H is not adjusted for demographics, a similarly unadjusted version of X, from the
same source, was used in calculating Q.  This Q is similar to that reported in Beitel et al. (1975).
14
(9)
tradeoff between precision, logical consistency, and national representativeness.
Figure 4 presents H and the implied density of driver BAC, Q % H/X, in arbitrary units.
5  The
prevalence of heavy drinkers in fatal crashes, long emphasized by NHTSA, is apparent here.  Heavy
drinkers comprise a much smaller fraction of all drivers, however; the difference between the two
proportions is attributable to the greatly elevated crash risk of heavy drinkers.
The final variable, S, is the monetary equivalent of the expected drunk driving penalty.
Kenkel (1993b) sets this out as follows:
with PA the probability of arrest, PC the probability of conviction if arrested, L the monetized penalty
if convicted, r the discount rate, and T the interval between crime and punishment.  All but r are
potentially functions of c, and each can be changed by the allocation of resources, policy, or both. 
The only one of these four terms that is directly observed across the full BAC domain is the
one that varies the most: PA, the probability of arrest (see the discussion in Perrine, Peck, and Fell,
1988).  This is taken from the classic source, Beitel et al. (1975), based on a field experiment in
Kansas City in 1973.  (Similar results are obtained in Hause, Voas, and Chavez, 1982, in California,
under similar circumstances.)  The probability of arrest conditional on BAC is calculated, in 0.05 unit
increments (0.01-0.05, etc.) from the unconditional probability of arrest in the field experiment and
survey evidence on the distribution of BAC among drivers who were, and were not, arrested for
drunk driving.  We converted this to 0.01 increments by fitting a cubic spline to the data.15
Lacking data on T, we assume it is constant in c, which is not unreasonable as discounting
should affect S little given the relatively short interval–months, not years–between arrest and
sentencing.   We assume the same for PC, given that conviction rates are very high to begin with, and
present supportive evidence below.  Data on actual penalties conditional on conviction (as opposed
to minima or maxima) is sketchier; the only published source we could find is a report by Tashima
(1986).  This finds these increase only slightly at BACs exceeding 0.20, and personal communication
with its author reveals that, since then, “sanctions have become much more homogenous for [drunk
driving] offenders.”  Thus we initially assume constant L, but later relax this using information on
aggravated drunk driving laws adopted by many states.  As a practical matter, dS/dc > 0 mostly
because more inebriated drivers are more likely to get caught.
Both S and S(c) - S(c-.01) . SN / M are presented in Figure 5.  The probability of arrest, and
hence the implied S, increases substantially at all BAC levels above 0.10; the risk of arrest at 0.20 is
about ten times that at 0.10, a sizeable difference but much smaller than the relative crash risks
illustrated above.  While the optimality condition involving S is based not on levels, but rates of
change, these too grow much more slowly for arrests than for fatalities.  Increases in M, at the bottom
of Figure 5, do not keep pace with increases in XN.
We can check the validity of our data by re-calculating S using, instead, the crash and drunk
driving conviction (not arrest) variables in Tashima and Daoud (2007), shown in Figure 3.  The
former and X determines Q; this and the convictions data determines the probability of being
convicted conditional on BAC, PAPC (again in arbitrary units).  This is an alternative measure of S if
T and L are assumed constant in c, as before.  It is very similar in Figure 5, suggesting several key
variables have been characterized with sufficient accuracy. 16
Figures 2-5 show that the greatest variation in key variables occurs at BACs far beyond the
current threshold of 0.08.  This disconnect is intriguing, suggesting that the greatest variation in our
optimality conditions may occur at BAC levels greatly exceeding those targeted by existing policy.
III.  Results.
Figure 6 graphs the cost-effectiveness condition for the BAC range 0.08-0.24.  This is the
difference between the value of decreased crash risk resulting from of a one unit reduction in driver
BAC and (mindful of the equality VN = SN) the utility loss resulting from that reduction, measured in
logs, and scaled to zero at c = 0.10.  Larger values are more cost-effective, the region where penalties
most need strengthening.  Welfare gains from penalty increases here would more than offset losses
from penalty decreases elsewhere, were these necessary to satisfy some constraint.
Cost-effectiveness is lowest at BACs below 0.15 and increases steadily thereafter, to a
maximum of 1.5 log points, a five-fold difference in cost-effectiveness over this range.  By this
standard, policy is too heavily weighted toward drivers with BACs under 0.15.  Reducing penalties
on these drivers and increasing them on heavier drinkers would save more lives at the same aggregate
“cost” in withheld consumption.  The potential improvement is substantial given the large difference
in cost-effectiveness at high and low BAC levels.
Figure 6 also illustrates the expediency condition over the same BAC range.  Each point of
this figure depicts, again in arbitrary, logged units scaled to zero at BAC = 0.10, the reduction in
crashes obtained by a one-unit increase in M at that BAC value.  Larger values are therefore more
expedient than smaller values.  This condition, too, is smallest at moderate BACs, below 0.12, rising17
rapidly above that point until falling again beyond 0.20.  The gap between maximum and minimum
is again sizeable, about one log point, similar to that observed for cost-effectiveness.  This large gap
implies that fatalities could be substantially reduced without changing the maximum penalty, by
increasing marginal penalties where expediency is largest and lowering them where it is smallest.
Is current policy more consistent with cost-effectiveness or expediency?  It is not easy to
choose.  While ranging significantly from maximum to minimum, each condition also takes a constant
value across a large portion of the domain.  In both cases deviations from constancy support
increasing marginal penalties at BACs far above the current 0.08, such as those in the 0.15-0.20 range
utilized for aggravated drunk driving laws.  
In fact, although current policy is neither expedient nor cost-effective, there is considerable
harmony between the two conditions.  As previously discussed, these will coincide if the marginal
penalty, M, is inversely proportional to the fraction of drivers at each BAC level, Q.  Fortuitously,
this is basically true, at least until BAC exceeds 0.20, as Figures 4 and 5 confirm.  One might
reasonably conclude that the similarities in these conditions are more noteworthy than their
differences.  This result is empirical, however, not theoretical, and need not hold elsewhere.
We now use these conditions to analyze four features of U.S. drunk driving policy.
Lower BAC Thresholds.  All states have lowered the illegal per se BAC threshold for adults
from 0.10 to 0.08.  This change increases marginal penalties, SN, in the neighborhood of 0.08 and
decreases them near 0.10.  How does this affect cost-effectiveness and expediency?
For this change to improve either, the value of the condition must be falling over the 0.08-
0.11 BAC range, meriting stronger penalties at lower end of this range, where cost-effectiveness and
expediency would be highest.  Instead, Figure 6 shows that cost-effectiveness is roughly constant6 One can also bound the effects of a 0.08 law mechanically, using the X and Q variables
presented above, by assuming that all drivers with BACs of 0.08 and 0.09 reduce consumption to
0.07 to comply with the new threshold.  This implies a reduction in fatalities, with full compliance,
of 1%.  This calculation further supports Freeman’s findings about the efficacy of 0.08 laws.
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over this range, while expediency is rising, as the elevation in crash risk at higher BACs more than
outweighs the increase in expected penalties.
The implication of this result is striking: lowering BAC thresholds from 0.08 to 0.10 should
not reduce traffic fatalities, and might increase them.  As marginal penalties are shifted downward
heavier drinkers relax their efforts to comply with the law, and this will outweigh the effect of
reduced consumption from the more modest drinkers the new law focuses on.  This conclusion runs
counter to two well-known studies supporting the efficacy of 0.08 laws, Dee (2001) and Eisenberg
(2003).  Analyzing fatalities from 1982 through 1998 (Dee) or 2000 (Eisenberg), both find 0.08 laws
reduce overall traffic fatalities by 2-3% compared to a threshold of 0.10.  This subject has been
recently re-examined by Freeman (2007, especially Figure 3 and Table 3, columns G-I), who extends
the sample to 1980-2004, adding several states that recently adopted 0.08 laws, and carefully
addresses serial correlation in the residuals, which is substantial.  When doing so, Freeman’s point
estimate is almost identically zero.  He then focuses on states passing these laws because of
congressional incentives, rather than voluntarily, as a cleaner “natural experiment” less likely to
generate biased coefficients.  In this group the point estimate, though insignificant, is positive,
consistent with the conclusions derived above.  It is unlikely that 0.08 laws have any material effect
on traffic fatalities, and plausible that they increase them slightly.
6
Aggravated Drunk Driving Laws.  According to Mothers Against Drunk Driving, forty
states currently have “aggravated drunk driving” statutes mandating additional penalties or reduced19
flexibility in adjudication or sentencing when the driver’s BAC exceeds a threshold that ranges from
0.15 to 0.20.  These extra penalties range from weak (South Dakota only requires pre-sentencing
alcohol evaluations at BACs of 0.17 or higher) to strong (Idaho requires ten days jail time, doubles
the maximum fine, and more than doubles the period of license suspension for drivers with BACs of
at least 0.20).  Several other countries also have similarly graduated penalties (NHTSA 2000).
In Figure 6 we analyze the effect of a hypothetical aggravated drunk driving law, somewhat
stronger than the median, that doubles penalties for BACs exceeding 0.15.  Cost-effectiveness is
dramatically improved.  Aggravated drunk driving laws increase marginal penalties in the BAC region
where increased penalties have the greatest ratio of benefits to costs.  Because drunk driving penalties
are inefficiently low (Kenkel, 1993a), economic efficiency increases as well.
We cannot show how aggregated drunk driving laws affect expediency without asserting how
they will change the distribution of fatalities, H, which no study has attempted to do.  Still, it is clear
from Figure 6 that expediency should also increase, as these laws operate in precisely the region of
the graph where increased penalties reduce external costs the most.  If drunk driving penalties are to
increase, this should occur at the BACs targeted by aggravated drunk driving laws: 0.15-0.20.
In an earlier analysis, Kenkel (1993a) argued aggravated drunk driving laws were probably
unwarranted under an efficiency criterion because the crash risk and the arrest risk increased with
BAC by similar proportions.  The more recent, more detailed data employed here indicate otherwise.
Accounting for hit-and-runs and breath test refusals makes the difference.  Blomberg et al. (2005)
track down about one-sixth of all hit-and-run drivers, many of whom have very high BACs, and use
passive alcohol sensors to impute the BAC of breath test refusals, many of whom also have high
BACs.  Accounting for these problems increases the relative risk at a BAC of 0.20 threefold.  This20
conclusion is reinforced with the California data reported in Figure 3, where the ratio of drunk driving
convictions to crashes (the difference in log points) diminishes steadily above a BAC of 0.08.  These
differences are brought into even sharper relief in our optimality conditions, which are based on
marginal changes in these variables, not levels.
Youth vs. Adults.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s states adopted lower BAC thresholds
for drivers under twenty-one, so called zero tolerance laws.  Is this supported by expediency or cost-
effectiveness?  Are other differences in the penalty structure between youth and adults so justified?
Efficiency-based age differences in drunk driving penalties can be justified by differences in
marginal crash risks, XN.  These clearly exist.  Zador et al. (2000) find crash risks are twice as high
for youth (particularly males, who cause most crashes) as for adults at all BAC levels studied, so
XNYOUTH(c) . 2XNADULT(c).  This proportionality implies the youth and adult penalty structures should
have similar shapes but different magnitudes.  Current policy has the opposite features: different
shapes, because the BAC thresholds differ, but similar magnitudes once the threshold is violated.
An equivalent result obtains for expediency, which depends on Mc G*/MM and H.  The studies
cited above suggest the rough constancy of Mc G*/MM applies for both youth and adults, while our
analysis of the FARS data indicates that the distribution of fatalities, H, is also proportional between
youth and adults (for drivers with positive BAC).  Expediency also implies the adult and youth
penalty structures should be similarly shaped.  This finding, coupled with our earlier results
concerning the expediency of lower BAC thresholds for adults, implies that zero tolerance laws, too,
should not reduce drunk driving fatalities.  In a recent, exhaustive, retrospective panel study, the first
to focus on assessing zero tolerance laws econometrically, Grant (2006) concludes the same thing.
Uniformity of Laws.  A final feature of drunk driving policy is increased uniformity across7 Cost-effectiveness does not depend on Q or H, only, possibly, on other factors w that
influence traffic safety.  When these factors increase the crash risk of all drivers by the same
proportion, so that X(w,c) = f(w)g(c), cost-effectiveness is identical across states, policy uniformity
is appropriate, and Federal mandates to bring this about may be justified.  One cannot determine
whether this separability is genuine, but it is plausible.
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the states, partly in response to Congressional incentives to enact 0.08 and zero tolerance laws.  Cox
(2006) has pointed out this uniformity need not be optimal, and this can be formally investigated here
by determining whether the optimality conditions that guide policy vary systematically across states.
If so, it is probably inappropriate for all states to have uniform BAC thresholds.
For expediency, this is likely to be so.  Based on calculations by the author and NHTSA, both
the extent of alcohol involvement in fatal crashes and the average BAC levels of the drivers involved
vary across states.  In 2002, for example, the percentage of drivers involved in fatal accidents having
a BAC of 0.08 or higher had a 0.90/0.10 decile range, across states, of 28% to 16%.  This variation
suggests the shape of H, and hence of the expediency condition, varies across states, as illustrated in
Figure 6 for the five states with the largest values of the aforementioned percentage and the five states
with the smallest values.  Differences between the two lines are dramatic.  Uniform policy is probably
not expedient.  Whether it is cost-effective is unclear.
7
IV.  Conclusions.
In academia traffic safety policy is generally viewed in hindsight, through retrospective
empirical studies of laws’ effects on traffic fatalities.  Here, however, hindsight is not perfect: these
studies are subject to the same estimation problems that plague economists elsewhere, and studies
of a given policy often generate conflicting or ambiguous results (Benson, Rasmussen, and Mast,22
1999).  Furthermore, this type of analysis is necessarily limited to laws that have been adopted fairly
widely for long enough that their influence on behavior can be estimated with confidence.  This
justifies considering an alternative approach not subject to these restrictions.
The alternative proffered here simply sets out the conditions that characterize optimal policy
and evaluates them with available data.  This allows the whole of the penalty structure to be
examined, for the first time, permitting both ex post analysis of existing policy or ex ante analysis of
new policy proposals.  One can adopt either an traditional efficiency perspective or a politically-
oriented expediency perspective; fortunately, here the two are quite harmonious in their implications.
This approach is not without weaknesses, however, particularly limitations of the economic analytical
approach and data limitations.  Still, observed deviations from optimality are large and robust, so our
essential conclusions are strongly supported.
Comprehensively, our findings support applying greater marginal penalties on drivers vastly
exceeding the current adult threshold of 0.08, whether they are youth or adults, permitting flexibility
in the penalty structure across states when doing so.  While legislation has evolved in this direction
in some respects, such as the adoption of aggravated drunk driving laws, it has diverged in others.
This may explain the stasis in drunk driving fatalities observed over the last decade, despite legislation
designed to lower BAC thresholds and drunk driving generally.  The tools presented here can be used
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Figure 2: Physiological Relationship between Alcohol Consumption and Crash Probability.25
Figure 3.  Drunk Driving Outcomes for California, 2004.
Note: Fatalities come from FARS, described in the text, and the other variables from Tashima and Daoud (2007).  Drunk driving
convictions include DUI and alcohol-related reckless driving convictions.  All variables are annual aggregates for the year 2004, logged.26
Figure 4.  Distribution of Fatalities and Imputed Distribution of Drivers by BAC Level.27
Figure 5: Legal Relationship between Alcohol Consumption and Expected Penalties.28
Figure 6.  Cost-Effectiveness Condition and Expediency Condition.29
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